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I. INTRODUCTION

In July 2012, Chick-fil-A President and Chief Operating Officer
Dan Cathy remarked to a religious publication that he and his
company supported the "biblical definition of the family unit."' Chickfil-A is popularly known as a Christian company that promotes
conservative, biblical values. 2 Mr. Cathy's statement was largely
interpreted by the media as an "anti-gay" sentiment rooted in
religious beliefs. 3 In response to Mr. Cathy's remark, government
officials from Boston and Chicago refused to allow the restaurant
chain to open new locations in their cities, citing the organization's
official policy of "discrimination."4
The Chick-fil-A controversy demonstrates how the intersection
of law, religion, and sexual orientation has come to the forefront of the
public consciousness. Indeed, sexual orientation discrimination is the
civil rights battleground of the modern era. 5 Public attitudes on gay
1. Alyssa Newcomb, Chicago Politician Will Ban Chick-fil-A from Opening Restaurant
After Anti-Gay Comments, ABC NEWS (July 25, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/chick-filblocked-opening-chicago-store/story?id=16853890#.UFeDQJjd7dk.
2. See Chick-fil-A's corporate mission statement, which states its mission is to "glorify
God." Chick-fil-A' Who We Are, CHICK-FIL-A (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.chick-fila.comlMedia/PDF/who-we-are.pdf. Chick-fil-A is the only national fast-food chain that closes on
Sundays, and company meetings include prayer. See id.
3. For Chick-fil-A's response to the media's coverage, see Dan T. Cathy, Dan Cathy,
President and COO of Chick-fil-A, Clarifies Recent News Coverage, PR NEWSWIRE
(Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dan-cathy-president-and-coo-of-chickfil-a-clarifies-recent-news-coverage-114872034.html (a public letter).
4. Newcomb, supra note 1.
5. See Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in a PostCivil-Rights Era, 110 HARV. L. REV. 684, 687 (1997) (reviewing two opposing descriptions of the
goals and techniques of the modem gay-rights movement).
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rights are evolving, and the legal landscape governing sexual
orientation discrimination is only just beginning to develop.6 No
federal law prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, despite the
repeated introduction of bills over the last twenty-five years.7 States
are roughly split on the appropriate response to sexual orientation
discrimination; twenty-one states and the District of Columbia
prohibit all employers from discriminating based on sexual
orientation, while nineteen states provide no protection against it.8
Nearly two hundred municipalities and local governments, like Boston
and Chicago, have chosen to make sexual orientation discrimination
illegal within their jurisdictions. 9 In short, legislatures, courts,
organizations, and individuals around the nation are working to
reconcile the important values implicated by sexual orientation
discrimination.
In the many jurisdictions where sexual orientation
discrimination is not illegal, a new litigation tactic has emerged:
reverse religious discrimination claims. Essentially, a reverse
religious discrimination claim allows "non-members of religious
groups" to sue supervisors for discriminating against them because
they do not share their supervisors' religious belief that being gay is
wrong.10 Reverse religious discrimination is a historically underused
claim that is gaining traction as a method to remedy sexual
orientation discrimination. Reverse religious discrimination claims
can be brought in all jurisdictions under Title VII of the Civil Rights

6.
See particularly the Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding gay marriage and the
civil rights of LGBT citizens in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) and
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
7.
For a history of the effort to pass a federal nondiscrimination act covering sexual

orientation, see Katrina C. Rose, Where the Rubber Left the Road: The Use and Misuse of History
in the Quest for the Federal Employment Non-DiscriminationAct, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 397, 397-98 (2009).
8.
See JEROME HUNT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, A STATE-BY-STATE
EXAMINATION
OF
NONDISCRIMINATION
LAWS
AND
POLICIES
3-4
(2012),
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-contentuploads/issues/2012/06/pdf/state-non
discrimination.pdf.
9.
See, for example, Manny Fernandez, San Antonio Passes Far-Reaching
Antidiscrimination Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
09/06/us/san-antonio-passes-far-reaching-antidiscrimination-measure.html?_r-O, for a discussion
of the rise in local ordinances banning sexual orientation discrimination and the accompanying
religious and social controversies.
10. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR: ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW, §§ 7.17.13 (Thomas Reuters ed. 2013) and Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2007), for
the basis of a reverse religious discrimination claim. Although not the first case to approve a
reverse religious discrimination claim, Noyes is frequently regarded as the landmark case on
these claims.
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Act of 1964.11 Accordingly, they have the potential to act as proxy
claims12 for litigants seeking compensation for sexual orientation
discrimination in jurisdictions where the discrimination is not illegal.
Although no Chick-fil-A employee has filed an action in
response to Mr. Cathy's statement, it may be vulnerable to a reverse
religious discrimination claim. Under this claim, a homosexual or
LGBT 13 employee who was fired by Chick-fil-A could seek reparations
for wrongful termination, even in a jurisdiction where the state or
local legislature has chosen not to prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination. LGBT employees who are alleged victims of sexual
orientation discrimination have already filed similar claims against
their employers in several jurisdictions. Circuit courts are divided on
how to treat reverse religious discrimination claims and the associated
policy issues.
This Note attempts to explore the most challenging legal
questions raised by reverse religious discrimination claims. What
standard of review is most appropriate? Should courts provide
effective protection against sexual orientation discrimination, even in
jurisdictions where a legislature has chosen not to prohibit it? And
finally, how should the legal system deal with the conflicting religious
expression and equal protection issues implicated by reverse religious
discrimination claims?
The primary goals of this Note are to analyze these new and
controversial issues and to propose a pragmatic solution. Part II
discusses the constitutional values implicated by reverse religious
discrimination claims; the prima facie analysis for Title VII
discrimination claims; federal, state, and local sexual orientation
discrimination laws; and unsuccessful litigation strategies for sexual
orientation discrimination. Part III discusses the emergence of the
reverse religious discrimination claim as the newest, and perhaps
most successful, litigation strategy for sexual orientation
discrimination. This Part also reviews and compares the majority and
minority approaches for establishing a prima facie case of reverse

11. Title VII is a federal law prohibiting employment discrimination based on a limited
number of classifications including race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See infra Part
II.B for a discussion of the elements of a Title VII discrimination claim.
12. In this Note, "reverse religious discrimination claims" and "proxy claims" will refer
exclusively to the use of a reverse religious discrimination claim (a recognized Title VII claim) to
seek redress for sexual orientation discrimination in jurisdictions where sexual orientation
discrimination is not prohibited.
13. This Note may refer to homosexual or LGBT employees interchangeably. While these
groups are not identical, either identifier may be used as needed to simplify analogies drawn
between cases.
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religious discrimination claims. Part III concludes by considering the
social and legal merits of proxy claims.
In response to the division in the courts, Part IV suggests a
new standard for adjudicating reverse religious discrimination claims.
This Note proposes modifying the prima facie analysis set forth in the
United States Supreme Court decision McDonnell Douglas v. Green.
The first prong of the proposed test requires the court to explicitly
examine whether the employer qualifies as a religious organization
exempt from Title VII. The second and third prongs of the proposed
test remain identical to the second and third prongs of the traditional
prima facie test. Then, to prevent the use of reverse religious
discrimination claims as proxies, the proposed test's fourth prong
requires plaintiffs to show a "difference in religious beliefs" between
their own beliefs and their employer's beliefs. Finally, the fifth prong
requires additional evidence of the employer's discriminatory motive.
This modified prima facie test conforms with employment
discrimination law, balances employers' rights to religious expression
and employees' rights to equal treatment, and represents a
compromise between the majority and minority approaches.
II. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

The possible link between sexual orientation discrimination
and religious convictions exposes difficult tensions among American
constitutional and legal values. Time-honored principles, including
religious expression, privacy, and equality, are briefly explored in this
Part to clarify the sometimes-competing interests in reverse religious
discrimination claims. Second, this Part describes the legal landscape
surrounding sexual orientation discrimination at the federal, state,
and local level. By summarizing the varying levels of protection for
sexual orientation discrimination across jurisdictions, this discussion
illustrates the need for an alternative litigation strategy for sexual
orientation discrimination. Since LGBT plaintiffs cannot sue an
employer for sexual orientation discrimination in jurisdictions where
it is not prohibited, and several different types of litigation strategies
have failed, plaintiffs have been seeking another type of claim that
can provide redress.
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A. A Crossroadsof ConstitutionalPrinciples
1. Religious Expression
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridgingthe freedom of speech, or of the press ....
-First Amendment to the U.S. Constitutionl4

The right to religious expression is outlined in the first clause
of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
signifying its prominent position among civil liberties.15 The Free
Exercise Clause recognizes the Founders' belief that religious practice
carries unique importance in the health and preservation of American
society. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson referred to freedom of religion as
"the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights." 6 The public
expression of privately held religious beliefs is essential to the
functioning of a free and democratic society. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 states that it is unlawful for an employer to
"discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's . . . religion." 7 According to George Dent, the very

existence of religious discrimination provisions in Title VII
acknowledges "our legal tradition's judgment that citizens legitimately
carry their religious beliefs into the commercial marketplace and
should be protected in doing so."'8

14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. Id.
16. George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religious Freedom, 95
KY. L.J. 553, 633 (2007).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
18. Dent, supra note 16, at 574 (quoting Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the
Workplace: Harassment or Protected Speech?, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 959, 964 (1999)).
However, extreme forms of public religious expression may not be protected in the workplace. An
employer's repeated proselytization of its employees may violate Title VII. For example, in
Minnesota v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., employers were "born-again Christians" who refused to
consider employment for anyone who lived in a way "antagonistic" to the teachings of the Bible,
which in their view included homosexuals. 370 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Minn. 1985). This policy
violated antidiscrimination laws. Id. at 853.
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2. Privacy
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life.... Persons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just
as heterosexualpersons do.
-Lawrence v. Texas19
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that a statute
criminalizing sexual intercourse between consenting, same-sex adults
was unconstitutional. 2 0 The Court's reasoning rested largely on the
proclamation that "[1]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expressions, and certain intimate
conduct." 21 The right to privacy outlined in Lawrence may reasonably
be applied to expand civil rights for homosexual individuals, though
the contours of this "liberty" remain uncertain. 22 Reverse religious
discrimination claims test the boundaries of the right to religious
expression and force courts to evaluate the relative fundamentality of
the right to privacy and the "autonomy of self." Courts must "weigh[]
the relative merits of religious freedom and homosexual conduct" to
achieve the proper balance between the interests of homosexual
employees and the interests of employers. 23
3. Equality
[N]or shall any State ... deny to any person within its
jurisdictionthe equal protection of the laws.
-Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution24
At the heart of American democracy is the ideal that every
citizen is entitled to the same rights and opportunities. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the
United States Constitution after the Civil War in order to achieve
formal legal equality among all citizens. The Supreme Court has

19. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
20. See id. at 578-79 (applying a substantive due process analysis to find a right to engage
in homosexual conduct without "intervention of the government").
21.

Id. at 562.

22. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 956-57 (Mass. 2003).
23. Dent, supra note 16, at 629.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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repeatedly relied on principles of equality and justice to extend civil
rights to minorities and other groups historically subject to
discrimination. 2 5 Because sexual orientation discrimination is often
premised on unfair stereotypes or animus, many courts have
concluded that it "has no place in a just society." 26 Indeed, some courts
have characterized such discrimination as "morally reprehensible" 27
and a "noxious practice" deserving of censure. 28
B. PursuingEquality: Title VII
[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or nationalorigin.
-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196429
Title VII was enacted at the height of the American Civil
Rights Movement as part of the omnibus bill known as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The Act addressed a variety of issues including
voting rights, discrimination in public accommodations, and
desegregation of public schools. 30 Congress created Title VII in order
to "assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate
those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered
racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority
25. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling the separate but equal
doctrine and desegregating public schools); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating
state laws prohibiting interracial marriage and recognizing marriage as a fundamental right);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits denial
of the right to vote based on race).
26. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2009).
27. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000)).
28. Id. at 265 (quoting Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st
Cir. 1999)).

29.

42 U.S.C.

30.

Id.

§§

§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2012).

1971(a), 2000a-2000d.
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citizens." 31 However, the law was also broadly intended to eliminate
"[d]iscriminatory preference for any group" within the workplace. 32
Title VII was meant to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of [an] impermissible classification." 33
1. Traditional Title VII Claims
To succeed on a traditional Title VII discrimination claim, the
plaintiff must either (1) demonstrate direct evidence of discrimination
or (2) rely on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. 34
Because employers almost never announce their discriminatory
purposes, most cases proceed under the McDonnell Douglas
framework. 35 The McDonnell Douglas analysis allows a plaintiff to
prove a discrimination claim through circumstantial evidence,
including "common sense and social context."36
A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case under the
McDonnell Douglas analysis. 37 To do so, the plaintiff must show
1. the plaintiff belongs to a protected class (typically a
minority group); 38
2. the plaintiff was performing according to the employer's
legitimate expectations;
3. the plaintiff suffered adverse employment action;39 and
4. other employees with qualifications similar to the plaintiff
were treated more favorably. 40
31. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 801.
34. See, e.g., ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining the process
of a Title VII discrimination claim).
35. See, e.g., id. (reviewing the prima facie standard for traditional discrimination claims).
36. Id.
37. As discussed in Part II.C, the elements of a prima facie case differ by claim asserted and
by circuit.
38. The original McDonnell Douglas prima facie test required membership in a minority
group explicitly. The first prong required the plaintiff to "show[] ... that he belongs to a racial
minority." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
39. In employment discrimination discussions, "adverse employment action" generally
refers to the prohibited decisions mentioned in Title VII: discharge, termination, or negative
alteration of the employee's compensation, employment terms, conditions or privileges. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) to -2(a)(2) (2012).
40. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). For a slightly
different conception of the prima facie test, see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802
(characterizing the test as applied to job seekers rather than to existing employees).
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For a religious discrimination claim in particular, a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case when she demonstrates
1. she held a sincere religious belief (and thus is a member of
a protected class);
2. she called her religious belief to the attention of the
employer;
3. the religious belief or observance was the basis of her
discharge or discriminatory treatment; and
4. she was performing according to her employer's legitimate
expectations. 41
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the burden
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for taking adverse employment action against the plaintiff.4 2 If
the defendant meets his burden by offering a legitimate rationale,
then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
defendant's
proffered reasons are merely a pretext for
discrimination. 43 Establishing a prima facie case then creates a
rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated
against the employee. 44 The prima facie requirement under McDonnell
Douglas serves an important screening role in employment
discrimination litigation by "eliminat[ing] the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection." 45
2. Reverse Discrimination Claims
Reverse discrimination has long been recognized as a
legitimate Title VII claim. 46 The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

41. See, e.g., Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508, 514 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing the prima facie
analysis for a religious accommodation case); Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599,
603-06 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining the prima facie analyses for religious disparate treatment
claims and failure-to-accommodate claims). The final criterion is not typically recited in courts'
prima facie tests. However, plaintiffs practically must prove this element to demonstrate that
the adverse employment action was not legitimate.
42. Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802).
43. See Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Chuang v. Univ. of
Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000)); Reverse Discrimination, [5 Empl. Practices]
Empl. Coordinator (West) § 4:7.50 (Sept. 2013).
44. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
45. Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 158 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54).
46. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976) (holding that
Title VII prohibits racial discrimination in private employment against white persons as well as
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analysis theoretically applies to both traditional and reverse
discrimination claims;4 7 however, courts have struggled with the
latter. 48 Because the prima facie test was originally created for
discrimination suits brought by members of a minority group, courts
have been attempting to "cram the reverse discrimination cases into
the McDonnell Douglas framework."49 Several courts have modified
the first prong of the prima facie framework in reverse discrimination
claims to require the plaintiff to show "background circumstances" to
prove that the defendant is an "unusual employer who discriminates
against the majority."50
Conversely, some courts have criticized imposing higher
burdens for reverse discrimination plaintiffs and have rejected both a
protected-class and a background-circumstances showing.5 1 The Third
Circuit, for example, rejects the background-circumstances
requirement for the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
test in reverse racial discrimination suits. 5 2 As an alternative, the
Third Circuit requires a plaintiff to "present[ ] sufficient evidence to
allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude (given the totality of the
circumstances) that the defendant treated [the] plaintiff 'less
favorably than others because of [his] race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.' "6

Reverse discrimination, however, may not even be properly
conceived as a separate type of employment discrimination. The
against nonwhites, thus recognizing "reverse" discrimination claims for Title VII protected
classes).
47. Iadimarco,190 F.3d at 158 (citing Sante Fe Trail, 427 U.S. at 278-80).
48. See, e.g., ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 158-60 (acknowledging that no universal standard for
reverse discrimination claims has emerged).
49. Id. at 158 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. See, e.g., Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(modifying the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie framework for reverse racial
discrimination claims because "it defies common sense to suggest that the promotion of a black
employee justifies an inference of prejudice against white coworkers in our present society").
51. See Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the
protected-class requirement for a prima facie case, but also not requiring a showing of
background circumstances); see also ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 160 (rejecting the backgroundcircumstances requirement for the first prong of a prima facie test); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) ("The prima facie case method established in
McDonnell Douglas was 'never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is
merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears
on the critical question of discrimination.' " (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978))).
52. Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 160-61 (stating that the central focus of every discrimination
claim inquiry should be whether an employer is treating an employee less favorably because of a
protected characteristic).
53. Id. at 163 (second alteration in original) (quoting Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577).
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Eleventh Circuit has rejected the "reverse discrimination" label for
claims brought by nonminorities. 54 The court stated that the term was
inappropriate because "[d]iscrimination is discrimination no matter
what the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of the victim." 55
3. Reverse Religious Discrimination Claims
Under Title VII, religion is defined to include "all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief."56 Employers are
required to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs, unless the
employer "demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate
to an employee's . .. religious observance or practice without undue

hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."57 Traditional
religious discrimination claims under Title VII involve an allegation
that an employer discriminated against an employee because of the
employee's religious beliefs.5 8 In contrast, reverse religious
discrimination claims involve an allegation that an employer
discriminated against an employee because he did not share the
employer's religious beliefs. 59
Reverse religious discrimination claims are analogous in many
ways to affirmative action and other reverse discrimination cases.60
Undoubtedly, Title VII protects atheists, nonbelievers, and unaffiliated religious persons, all of whom may be considered "religious
minorities."61 However, reverse religious discrimination cases are
different from other types of reverse discrimination claims because
they are not premised on the minority discriminating against the
majority. 62 For example, reverse racial discrimination occurs when a
54. See Bass v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1103 (11th Cir. 2001) (describing the
scope of Title VII in adjudicating discrimination claims brought by members of a traditional
"majority" group).
55. Id. (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976)).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
57. Id.
58. Harold M. Brody & Catherine Brito, Reversing Claims of Reverse Religious
Discrimination, 34 EMP. REL. TODAY 77, 77 (2007), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1002/ert.20167/abstract.
59. Id.
60. See Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining
that the plaintiffs reverse religious discrimination claim resembled other reverse discrimination
cases to which the court had applied a modified McDonnell Douglas test).
61. See, e.g., Young v. Sw. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 141 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding
that Title VII prohibited the defendant-employer from requiring the plaintiff, an atheist, to
attend monthly staff meetings involving short devotionals and prayers).
62. See, e.g., McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976) (holding
that Title VII is not limited to discrimination against minority persons, but also addresses
discriminatory actions against majority persons).
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minority (e.g., an African American) supervisor terminates a member
of a majority race (e.g., a Caucasian) based on his race. But reverse
religious discrimination could occur when a Christian (a member of a
majority religious group) fires an employee for not sharing his
religious beliefs.
C. The Next Frontier:Sexual OrientationDiscrimination
Sexual orientation was not listed as a protected class in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Over the last fifty years, however, a growing
number of jurisdictions have acted to prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination in employment. This Part explores the developing legal
landscape at the federal, state, and local levels.
1. The Federal Response to Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Although Congress has considered legislation that would
amend Title VII to prohibit employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation every year since 1975, no federal law prohibiting
sexual orientation discrimination has been enacted.63 As an employer,
however, the federal government prohibits sexual orientation
discrimination. 6 4 The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 bans federal
employees from discriminating against applicants and employees
based on conduct which does not adversely affect their performance.65
The United States Office of Special Counsel and other executive offices
have interpreted this provision to include discrimination based on

63.

See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013 ("ENDA"), H.R. 1755, 113th Cong.

(2013); ROBERT BELTON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 555 (7th ed. 2004) (observing

that some federal courts have viewed Congress's failure to enact ENDA as evidence that
Congress did not intend "sex," as used in Title VII, to include sexual orientation). However,
federal reform on sexual orientation discrimination may be forthcoming. In his 2013 Inaugural
Address, President Obama stated, "Our journey is not complete until our gay brothers and
sisters are treated like everyone else under the law . . . for if we are truly created equal, then
surely the love we commit to one another must be equal as well." The President's statement
marked the first mention on gay rights in an inauguration speech and may indicate that the
Obama Administration will pursue the enactment of ENDA in the President's second term.
(Jan. 21,
2013),
available at
Obama, Presidential
Inaugural Address
Barack
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-barackobama.
64. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); Exec. Order No. 13,087, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1998)
(prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in the employment of federal civilian workers).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10).
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sexual orientation.66 Additionally, the federal government has
protected civilian employees in the Executive Branch from
discrimination based on sexual orientation since 1998.67
2. State and Local Responses to Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination by all employers-public and private.68 An
additional ten states have enacted laws that prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination when the state is an employer. 69
State laws proscribing sexual orientation discrimination are
generally alike in their construction and content. A majority of state
laws define "sexual orientation" to mean "heterosexuality,
homosexuality, and bisexuality ... includ[ing] people who are
perceived by others to be . . . a specific orientation." 70 All state statutes
that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination by public and private
employers provide a private right of action, allowing employees to seek
redress in local courts after exhausting administrative remedies.71
Like many federal anti-discrimination laws, state laws typically
exempt sufficiently small businesses, though eight states and the
District of Columbia apply the prohibition to all employers. 72 The
highest minimum threshold required to trigger anti-sexual orientation
66. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, Results of Legal Review of
Discrimination Statute (Apr. 8, 2004), available at http://www.ose.gov/documents/press/
2004/pr04_03.htm.
67. See 3 C.F.R. § 191 (1998) (adding sexual orientation discrimination to a list of alreadyprotected classes).
68. The same jurisdictions provide a private right of action: California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Jerome Hunt, A State-by-State
Examination of Nondiscrimination Laws and Policies, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND
3-4 (2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/06/pdf/state_nondis
crim ination.pdf.
69. Ten (10) states prohibit sexual orientation discrimination by the state government as an
employer: Alaska, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri (Executive Branch
employees only), Montana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. This policy choice is equivalent to the
federal government's decision to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination as an employer. See

id.
70. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-135R, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER
IDENTITY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: OVERVIEW OF STATE STATUTES AND COMPLAINT DATA 2
(2009).
71. See Hunt, supranote 68, at 3-4 (listing the states which prohibit sexual orientation and
gender identity discrimination).
72. Colorado, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon,
Vermont, and Wisconsin require only a single employee to trigger application of the state
nondiscrimination statute. See Hunt, supra note 68, at 26-80.
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discrimination laws across all states is fifteen employees. 73 Notably,
all state anti-discrimination statutes offer at least a limited exemption
for religious organizations. 7 4 The exemption allows religious
organizations to prefer applicants who share their religious beliefs.75
However, the most significant legislation on sexual orientation
discrimination originates in local governments. More than 180 cities,
counties, and municipalities prohibit sexual orientation discrimination
in at least some workplaces.76 Many local ordinances are similar to the
City of Chicago's Human Rights Ordinance. Like the majority of state
laws, this ordinance defines sexual orientation as "the actual or
perceived state of heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality."7 7
73. Id.
74. Id. at 3-4.
75. A religious organization receives an exemption from compliance with Title VII and most
state sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws. See infra Part III.B.
76. Municipalities and counties in states with sexual orientation nondiscrimination policies
have also enacted their own nondiscrimination laws. Several municipalities in New York State
including Albany, Buffalo, Hampton, Ithaca, New York City, Rochester, and Syracuse have
adopted sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws. Albany, Nassau, Onondaga, Tompkins, and
Westchester Counties have also adopted sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws. Often, local
statutes may be more favorable to employees than statewide laws. For example, the New York
state law does not provide for attorneys' fees or punitive damages, but the New York City

municipal law does. See, e.g., Lee F. Brantle, The Emerging Field of Equal Rights for Gay and
Lesbian Employees, BANTLE & LEVY, LLP, http://civilrightsfirm.com/article4.html (last visited
Sept. 10, 2013) (listing the municipalities and counties in New York State with
antidiscrimination laws).
Municipalities and counties in states without sexual orientation nondiscrimination
policies also enact nondiscrimination laws. See sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws in
Allegheny County, Philadelphia, York, Scranton, Allentown, Easton, Lansdowne, Swarthmore,
West Chester, Erie County, and New Hope. Pennsylvania only prohibits sexual orientation
discrimination by the state government. Notably, Allegheny County adopted the law after
serious opposition from religious groups who claimed the bill infringed on their religious
freedom. The bill passed after a religious exemption provision was added to excuse religious
organizations from liability under the bill. See Mark T. Phillis & Shannon H. Pallotta, Local

Ordinance ProhibitsDiscriminationon the Basis of Sexual Orientationand Gender Identity with
Some Employers Exempted, LITTLER (July 9, 2009), http://www.littler.com/publicationpress/publication/local-ordinance-prohibits-discrimination-basis-sexual-orientation-and(describing the passage of a local ordinance in Allegheny County which prohibited discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender identity).
Discrete cities may be the only location in an entire state that prohibits sexual
orientation discrimination. For example, Omaha prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, but
no other city or county in the state of Nebraska prohibits sexual orientation discrimination. See

Richard B. Cohen, Nebraska Attorney General Rules that Omaha Had No Right to Prohibit
Employment DiscriminationBased on Sexual Orientationor Gender Identity, Fox ROTHSCHILD,
LLP (May 6, 2012), http://employmentdiscrimination.foxrothschild.com/2012/05/articles/genderidentity-or-expression/nebraska-attorney-general-rules-that-omaha-had-no-right-to-prohibitemployment-discrimination-based-on-sexual-orientation-or-gender-identity/ (describing Omaha's
antidiscrimination law and its unique status in Nebraska).
77. CHICAGO, ILL., CHICAGO HUMAN RIGHTS ORDINANCE § 2-160-020(l) (2005) ("Sexual
orientation").

254

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1:239

Chicago's ordinance prohibits "directly or indirectly discriminat[ing]
against
any individual
in . .. employment
individual's . .. sexual orientation ....

because

of

the

In addition to governmental prohibitions, some private
employers have voluntarily chosen to prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination. Of the current Fortune 500 Companies, 484 have
included sexual orientation in their nondiscrimination policies.79 By
comparison, in 2004, only 323 of Fortune 500 companies had sexual
orientation nondiscrimination policies.80
Despite the growing number of federal regulations, state and
local statutes, and private company policies, many Americans work in
environments where discriminating against employees because of
their sexual orientation is not illegal. In nineteen states, employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation is legal for all public and
private employers. 8' An employer may make any employment decision
based only on the employee's identification (or perceived
identification) as gay, lesbian, transgender, or bisexual. Even among
the ten states that protect public employees from sexual orientation
discrimination, those workers are typically limited to administrative
remedies and cannot bring a private action for compensation or
reinstatement. 82 In these twenty-nine uncovered or partially covered
states, employees and their lawyers have been exploring proxy claims
to redress sexual orientation discrimination.
D. Unsuccessful Proxy Claims for Sexual OrientationDiscrimination
Over the past four decades, litigants have unsuccessfully
attempted to redress sexual orientation discrimination through two
types of proxy claims: (1) constitutional claims and (2) Title VII sex
discrimination claims. This Section discusses the shortcomings of
these legal theories.
78. Id. § 2-160-030.
79. Fortune 500 Non-Discrimination Project, EQUALITY F., http://www.equalityforum
.com/fortune500 (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
80. Id.
81. Nineteen (19) states do not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination by either public or
private employers: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Hunt, supra note 68, at 3-4 (listing
states which do not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation).
82. Arizona does not allow public employees to bring a private action for sexual orientation
discrimination; they can only pursue administrative remedies. See Exec. Order No. 2003-22
(Ariz. 2003), availableat http://www.azsos.gov/aar/2003/37/governor.pdf (directing that no state
agency, board, or commission shall discriminate in employment solely on the basis of an
individual's sexual orientation, but not requiring employment goals based on sexual orientation).
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1. Constitutional Claims
LGBT employees have unsuccessfully brought three types of
constitutional proxy claims to redress alleged sexual orientation
discrimination: (a) Equal Protection claims, (b) First Amendment
claims, and (c) Due Process claims. In many ways, homosexuality
"straddles the line between conduct and status in ways that make it
hard to apply conventional constitutional doctrine." 83
a. Equal Protection Theory
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
the primary vehicle for challenging sexual orientation discrimination
in the workplace on constitutional grounds. 84 The Clause provides that
"[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 85 However, equal protection represents a
limited vehicle for challenging sexual orientation discrimination
because the Clause only applies to public employers. Moreover, courts
have applied rational basis review to state and federal laws
prohibiting homosexual conduct.86 The Supreme Court's consistent
application of rational basis review87 in cases involving homosexual
activity makes it unlikely that the Court will make sexual orientation

83. Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1457 (2004).
84. THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 19-20 (2d ed.
2008)
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
86. HAGGARD, supra note 84. For example, in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industry Security
Clearance Office, the Ninth Circuit applied a rational relationship test, rather than strict
scrutiny, to the Department of Defense's discriminatory policy regarding gay applicants for
security clearance. 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying rational basis review and holding
that homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or "quasi-suspect" class under equal protection
analysis).
The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to race and national origin.
Classifications based on sex receive only intermediate scrutiny. Particularly given the Court's
application of rational basis review in Romer v. Evans, and its reluctance to review a case
involving the issue of whether sexual orientation is a suspect class, it seems unlikely that a
Court will decide to provide strict scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation. Andrea
M. Kimball, Note, Romer v. Evans and Colorado'sAmendment 2: The Gay Movement's Symbolic
Victory in the Battle for Civil Rights, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 219, 242 n.245 (1996).
87. In constitutional inquiries, courts generally apply three levels of review: rational basis,
which requires that a government regulation be rationally related to a legitimate government
interest; intermediate scrutiny, which requires that a government regulation be substantially
related to an important government interest; and strict scrutiny, which requires that a
government regulation be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest. R.
Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related
Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The "Base Plus Six" Model and Modern
Supreme Court Practice,4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 228 (2002).
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a suspect class worthy of heightened scrutiny.88 In Romer v. Evans,
the majority applied only rational basis review to Colorado's
constitutional amendment prohibiting protection for sexual
orientation discrimination.89
b. FirstAmendment Theory
Courts have generally dismissed speech-based First
Amendment challenges arising from homosexual conduct. For
example, the Seventh Circuit upheld Don't Ask Don't Tell, a nowdefunct Army regulation requiring the discharge of any member who
admitted to being homosexual.90 Although the court recognized that
self-classification as homosexual was in "some sense speech," 91 it also
held that being a homosexual implies sexual conduct that the military
could constitutionally prohibit. 92 Thus, the court concluded that the
military regulation affected speech only "incidentally," and the
regulation was justified because it supported other sufficiently
goals. 93 Similarly, taking adverse
important governmental
employment action 94 against an employee because he advocates for
homosexuality violates the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, but adverse employment action motivated by the
employee's homosexual behavior has not been held unconstitutional. 95

88. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (holding that engaging in
homosexual activity was not a fundamental right and applying rational basis review); see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (overruling Bowers, concluding that consenting
adults were free to engage in private, homosexual conduct, but applying rational basis review);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996) (imposing the rational basis level of scrutiny).
89. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32 (holding that Colorado's amendment failed the rational basis
test because it "imposed a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group" and
was so broad that it could only be motivated by animus).
90. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989). However, the court suggested
it applied a more deferential standard in reviewing military regulations than it would in
reviewing regulations on civilian society. See id. at 459-60 (acknowledging that military
institutions require different standards than civilian life).
91. Id. at 462.
92. See id. at 459-63 (clarifying that a sergeant's First Amendment rights were not violated
by her disqualification for service based on her homosexuality). However, these narrow views
about speech and homosexuality in the military may be changing in the wake of the repeal of the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPEAL OF "DON'T ASK, DON'T
TELL" (DADT): QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE (2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/
Free
home/features/2010/0610_dadt/QuickReferenceGuideRepeal-ofDADT_APPROVED.pdf.
speech challenges in the private workplace may still be difficult for LGBT employees.
93. Id.
94. See supra note 39.
95. See Nat'l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1273-75 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd,
470 U.S. 903 (1985) (holding that firing a public employee for engaging in public homosexual
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c. Due Process Theory
Litigants
have
also
challenged
sexual
orientation
discrimination under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, specifically invoking the right to privacy.96 In Lawrence
v. Texas, the Supreme Court stated that "individual decisions" about
"the intimacies of [a] physical relationship . . . are a form of 'liberty'

protected by the . .. Fourteenth Amendment." 97 While the Lawrence
decision clarified that homosexual activity cannot be criminalized, it
did not clearly speak to the employment context. Previously, the Tenth
Circuit had held that terminating a teacher for practicing
homosexuality would not violate the constitutional right to privacy. 98
In National Gay Task Force, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
constitutional right to engage in homosexual activity in private did not
apply to employment actions motivated by an employee's public
display of homosexuality.99
2. Sex Discrimination Claims
Although same-sex harassment'00 falls within the scope of
conduct prohibited by Title VII, discrimination based on an employee's
sexual preference or orientation remains formally outside of Title VII's
protection. 01 Plaintiffs have unsuccessfully advanced several theories
for demonstrating that sexual orientation discrimination is
discrimination based on sex-an existing Title VII protected class. For
example, LGBT plaintiffs have argued the following: if a woman were
male instead of female, she would not be discriminated against for her
sexual association with another female; she would simply be a male

activity was constitutional, and that sexual orientation was not subject to strict scrutiny analysis
under the Equal Protection Clause).
96. HAGGARD, supra note 84, at 20. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)
(overruling Texas's criminal sodomy statute based on the substantive due process right of
privacy).
97. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
98. Nat'? Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1273.
99. Id.
100. Same-sex harassment refers to the sexual harassment of an individual by a person who
is of the same sex as the victim.
101. This technical and formal approach adopted by courts illustrates the need for plaintiffs
to seek compensation for sexual orientation discrimination through recognized and existing Title
VII claims-like reverse religious discrimination. See HAGGARD, supra note 84, at 132-33
(discussing the various theories plaintiffs have advanced for sexual orientation discrimination
relief).
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engaging in heterosexual behavior. 102 Courts have generally rejected
this theory, however, citing Congress's narrow intent to protect
against traditional sex discrimination.10 3 In Hamm v. Weyauwega
Milk Products, Inc., the Seventh Circuit dismissed a plaintiffs sex
discrimination claim because his evidence of sexual harassment
related, at best, to his perceived sexual orientation, not his gender. 104
LGBT plaintiffs have also attempted to characterize
discrimination against homosexuals as a form of illegal gender
stereotyping. 105 Typically, sexual stereotyping cases point to an
employer's discrimination against an employee because the employee
lacked the typical mannerisms, appearance, or characteristics
expected of the specific gender. 06 For example, in Prowel v. Wise
Business Forms, an effeminate gay man claimed he was discriminated
against because he did not conform to a typical male stereotype.107 The
Third Circuit allowed the sexual stereotype case to proceed under a
Title VII analysis but cautioned that the critical question was
"whether the harassment [Prowel] suffered . . . was because of his

homosexuality, his effeminacy, or both."08 The court noted that while
it was probable that Prowel was discriminated against because of his
sexual orientation, it was also possible that he was harassed for his
"failure to conform to gender stereotypes."109 This distinction is
difficult to identify but conceptually important because it limits the
scope of Title VII to the classes and characteristics Congress intended
to protect.
Prowel marks an unusual acceptance of alternative theories
advanced by LGBT plaintiffs. However, the Third Circuit was careful
to note the distinction between sexual orientation discrimination and
gender stereotype discrimination. This demarcation indicates that the
102. HAGGARD, supra note 84, at 132.

103. Id.
104. See Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 2003)
(discussing the necessary separation between discrimination based on an employee's "sex" and
discrimination based on perceived or actual sexual orientation).

105. Id.; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1985) (recognizing that a
plaintiff may bring a Title VII sex discrimination claim for gender stereotyping).
106. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-52 (stating where an employer assumes
certain characteristics about an employee based on the employee's gender, the employer has
engaged in "sex stereotyping").
107. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2009).
108. Id. at 291.
109. Id. at 291-92. Notably, Prowel brought a Title VII gender stereotyping and religious
harassment claim in Pennsylvania, which only prohibits sexual orientation discrimination by the
government. Both claims were arguably a proxy claim for sexual orientation discrimination. As

discussed in Part V, the Third Circuit dismissed Prowel's religious harassment claim because it
was "based entirely on his status as a gay man." Id. at 292-93.

2014]1

DELIMITING TITLE VII

259

Third Circuit was unwilling to allow gender stereotyping to serve as a
proxy for sexual orientation discrimination and would police the
boundaries between the two different types of claims.110
Moreover, courts outside the Third Circuit have consistently
rejected these alternative Title VII theories that use sex
discrimination as a proxy for sexual orientation discrimination."1 In
rejecting these proxy claims, courts have largely relied on Congress's
intent not to protect sexual orientation from employment
discrimination. Article III courts and administrative law courts like
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission often cite Congress's
failure to explicitly list sexual orientation discrimination as a Title VII
category.112 Courts interpret this inaction as indicating that Congress
intended "sex" to refer to gender, not sexual affiliations." 3
The collective failure of alternative litigation strategies under
the Constitution and Title VII has incentivized plaintiffs to turn to
reverse religious discrimination claims as a legal remedy for sexual
orientation discrimination.
III. THE NEWEST PROXY FOR SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION:
REVERSE RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

Over the past ten years, complaints of religious discrimination
in the workplace have increased eighty-seven percent-far more than
any other type of workplace complaint.11 4 Not surprisingly, reverse
religious discrimination claims have also increased as a method to
110. Id. at 291-93.
Ill. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating a
plaintiff employee who failed to show he was discriminated against because he was a man failed

to bring a valid Title VII claim); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir.
2001) (stating discrimination based on characteristics other than race, color, sex, or national
origin was not prohibited by Title VII); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.,
224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000) (interpreting Title VII to not cover discrimination based on
sexuality or sexual orientation); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751-52 (4th
Cir. 1996) ("Title VII does not reach discrimination based on other reasons, such as the
employee's sexual behavior, prudery, or vulnerability."); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608
F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979) (dismissing male and female homosexuals' claims that
discrimination based on sexual orientation fell within Title VII's "sex" protected class).
112. Bibby, 260 F.3d at 261 ("It is clear, however, that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Congress has repeatedly rejected legislation that
would have extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation." (internal citations omitted)).
113. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35-36 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting DeCintio v.
Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1986)) (discussing why "sex" refers
exclusively to membership in a class "delineated by gender").

114. Courtney Rubin, Religious DiscriminationComplaints on the Rise at Work, INC. (Oct.
20, 2010), http://www.inc.cominews/articles/2010/10/complaints-of-religious-discrimination-onthe-rise.html.
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circumvent Title VII's lack of protection against sexual orientation
discrimination. 115 Even in the twenty-two states where sexual
orientation discrimination is already prohibited, more than eight
thousand complaints of sexual orientation discrimination were filed
between 2005 and 2010.116 Together, these statistics suggest that
LGBT employees in all jurisdictions perceive themselves as victims of
sexual orientation discrimination and are increasingly seeking legal
recourse.
A. Methods of Analysis for Reverse Religious DiscriminationClaims
United States Courts of Appeals are split on the appropriate
treatment of reverse religious discrimination claims as proxies for
sexual orientation discrimination. A minority of courts have explicitly
refused to allow reverse religious discrimination claims, while the
majority have adopted a more permissive approach by lowering the
prima facie standard. Allowing a proxy claim to proceed could hold an
employer civilly liable for expressing a personal belief that
homosexual conduct is morally unacceptable. Refusing to allow the
proxy claim to proceed could threaten homosexual employees' rights to
privacy and autonomy. But more broadly, circuit courts are divided on
the appropriate burden of proof for establishing a prima facie case in a
reverse religious discrimination case. This Section outlines the
majority and minority approaches to prima facie cases of reverse
religious discrimination and then compares their strengths and
weaknesses.
1. Minority Approach: Traditional Prima Facie Test
The Third and Sixth Circuits have chosen to balance the values
of religious expression and nondiscrimination by applying the
traditional prima facie test for reverse religious discrimination claims.
Both circuits implicitly require plaintiffs to satisfy the first prong of
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard; that is, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that they are members of a Title VII protected class. In
115. In 1996, reverse religious discrimination claims were specifically suggested as an
alternative route to relief from sexual orientation discrimination in jurisdictions without
protection for homosexual employees. See Kimball, supra note 86, at 242-45 (offering the reverse
religious discrimination claim as an alternative theory for gay rights cases when an employer's
religious intolerance creates prejudice); see also RAYMOND F. GREGORY, ENCOUNTERING
RELIGION IN THE WORKPLACE 236-37 (2011) (discussing plaintiffs' incentives to fit sexual
orientation discrimination into an existing Title VII protected class).
116. See HUNT, supra note 8, at 18 (aggregating the number of sexual orientation
discrimination complaints by state from 2005 to 2010).
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particular, plaintiffs must show that their homosexuality is derived
from their religiousbeliefs." 7
In Pedreirav. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., the
Sixth Circuit refused to allow a reverse religious discrimination claim
to serve as a proxy for sexual orientation discrimination.118 The
plaintiff, Alice Pedreira, worked at a children's home owned and
operated by the defendant, Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children
(KBHC)." 9 Her employers were unaware that she was homosexual
when she was hired. 120 When KBHC learned of Pedreira's sexual
orientation, she was terminated because her lifestyle was "contrary to
Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children core values." 12 1 Pedreira
brought a Title VII action challenging her termination and KBHC's
anti-homosexual policies, claiming that the policies exhibited religious
discrimination. 122 Pedreira argued that KBHC fired her because "she
[did] not hold KBHC's religious belief that homosexuality is sinful."123
Pedreira's reverse religious discrimination claim failed because
she did not allege that her homosexual lifestyle was religious in
nature. The court noted that "[i]t is undisputed that KBHC fired
Pedreira on account of her sexuality. However, Pedreira has not
explained how this constitutes discrimination based on religion."124
Pedreira did not offer any evidence as to her personal religious beliefs,
so she was unable to claim that KBHC policies regarding
homosexuality violated them.125 The court reasoned, "To show that the
termination was based on her religion, [the plaintiff] must show that
it was the religious aspect of her [conduct] that motivated her
employer's actions."126 Presumably, even a showing that the plaintiffs
religion approved of homosexuality would not suffice. In other words,
to succeed on a reverse religious discrimination claim in the Sixth

117. While the Sixth Circuit insisted it was not ruling on'the prima facie standard for
reverse religious discrimination claims, it dismissed Pedreira's claim essentially for failing to
demonstrate that she was discriminated against based on her religion. See Pedreira v. Ken.
Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 579 F.3d 722, 728 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal for
failure to state a claim).
118. Id. at 725, 728.
119. Id. at 725-26.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 725.
122. Id. at 725-27.
123. Id. at 727-28.
124. Id. at 728.
125. GREGORY, supra note 115, at 236-37.
126. Pedreira,579 F.3d at 728 (citing Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618,
627 (6th Cir. 2000)).
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Circuit, a plaintiff must allege that her sexual orientation is derived
from personal religious beliefs.
Similarly, the Third Circuit explicitly dismissed a reverse
religious discrimination claim as a proxy for sexual orientation
discrimination.12 7 In Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, a gay man
claimed that he was fired because his homosexual conduct did not
conform to the company's religious beliefs. Prowel offered evidence
that his coworkers left prayers, religious tracts, and notes condemning
his lifestyle on his property.128 Ultimately, Prowel asserted that he
failed to conform to his co-workers' religious beliefs because he was a
gay man, which his co-workers "considered to be contrary to being a
good Christian." 129
The plaintiffs identification of the single religious belief that "a
man should not lay with another man" did not overcome the Third
Circuit's "conclusion that he was harassed not 'because of religion,' but
because of his sexual orientation."1 3 0 The Third Circuit noted that an
employee's failure to comply with an employer's singular religious
belief that homosexuality is wrong was not sufficient to state a claim
of reverse religious discrimination.131 The Third Circuit contrasted
Prowel's claim against the plaintiffs claim in Erdmann v. Tranquility
Inc.132 In Erdmann, a homosexual employee claimed religious
discrimination because his employer insisted that he become
heterosexual.133 Unlike Prowel, Erdmann claimed that he had suffered
from reverse religious discrimination because his employer repeatedly
demanded that Erdmann convert to the employer's faith and lead the
company's daily prayer service. 13 4 Prowel had not cited any similar
facts suggesting that he had suffered religious coercion at his
workplace.135 Through this comparison, the Third Circuit suggested
that a plaintiff must satisfy the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie standard by demonstrating that he was discriminated
against based on the difference between his personal religious beliefs

127. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2009).
128. Id. at 287-88.
129. Id. at 293.
130. Id. at 292-93.
131. Id.
132. See Erdmann v. Tranquility Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1160-61 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(evaluating a homosexual employee's claim of reverse religious discrimination because his
employer required him to participate in daily prayers at work and repeatedly told him that he
would go to hell if he did not "give up his homosexuality and become a Mormon").
133. Id. at 1156.
134. Id. at 1160-62.
135. Prowel, 579 F.3d at 288.
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and those of his employer, and not merely the absence of a single
religious belief regarding homosexuality.
2. Majority Approach: Reduced Prima Facie Test
At least three circuit courts agree that it should be easier for
plaintiffs to make a prima facie case when an employee claims he was
discharged because he did not hold the same religious views as his
supervisor (as opposed to claiming that he was fired because of his
own religious beliefs). 136 In Shapolia v. Los Alamos National
Laboratories, the Tenth Circuit announced a new standard for
establishing a prima facie case in a reverse religious discrimination
case. 137 In Shapolia, the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated not
because of his own religious beliefs, but because he did not share his
employer's religious faith (Mormonism).138 While the Tenth Circuit
considered this class of cases to be analogous to affirmative action or
other "reverse discrimination" cases, it modified only the prima facie
standard for reverse religious discrimination cases.139
Under the Shapolia standard, a plaintiff is not required to
demonstrate that he is a member of a protected class to make a prima
facie case. The Tenth Circuit stated that the protected-class factor was
inappropriate "[w]here discrimination is not targeted against a
particular religion, but against those who do not share a particular
religious belief."140 Under the Shapolia test, the plaintiff must only
show
1. he was subjected to some adverse employment action;
2. his job performance was satisfactory at the time the
employment action was taken; and
3. some additional evidence supports the inference that the
employment actions were taken because of a discriminatory

136. See Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a
reverse religious discrimination plaintiff is not required to establish membership in a protected
class); Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1997) (summary judgment
inappropriate where there is a material question of fact whether employer required employees
adhere to his own religious beliefs); Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1038 (10th
Cir. 1993) (traditional test for establishing traditional race or sex discrimination claim
inapplicable where employee claims he was terminated for not holding same religious beliefs as
employer).
137. Shapolia, 992 F.2d at 1038-39.
138. Id. at 1035.
139. Id. at 1038 & n.6.
140. Id. at 1038.
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motive based upon the employee's failure to hold or follow
his employer's religious beliefs. 141
In Shapolia, the plaintiffs allegations were most likely not enough to
affirmatively meet his prima facie burden1 42 because he alleged only
that one Mormon supervisor reviewed another Mormon supervisor's
appraisal of a non-Mormon employee. 143 This single instance of alleged
bias was not enough to support the inference of a discriminatory
motive.144
The Seventh Circuit also agreed in Venters v. City of Delphi
that a plaintiff could establish a prima facie reverse religious
discrimination case without demonstrating that she belonged to a
protected class.145 As always, the plaintiff could establish a prima facie
case by providing direct evidence of the employer's animus against his
religion.146 Alternatively, the Seventh Circuit stated that a plaintiff
could provide indirect evidence reflecting the supervisor's propensity
to evaluate employees based on illegal criteria. 147 Furthermore, the
court suggested that an employee does not need to specify or "label"
her own religious beliefs.148
In Venters, the plaintiff offered direct evidence of the alleged
reverse religious discrimination.149 Venters, a public employee
working for a police department, provided evidence that her employer
described the police station as "God's house," threatened to fire her if
she did not "choose God's way," and stated that her job required her to
"be saved." 50 In light of these repeated attempts to convert Venters,
the court found that the employer's remarks created an inference that
religion played a role in Venters's discharge.
The Seventh Circuit also recognized the tension between the
employee's right to protection from discrimination and the employer's

141. Id.
142. While the court noted that it was not deciding "whether Shapolia met his prima facie
burden," it expressed doubt that the facts Shapolia alleged were sufficient to carry his initial
burden. Id. at 1039.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 971-73 (7th Cir. 1997) (evaluating the
appropriate standard for a prima facie case in a reverse religious discrimination claim).
146. Id. at 972-73.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 972.
149. Id. at 973. The plaintiff's introduction of direct evidence took the court's analysis out of
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard, but the court articulated its position nevertheless.
150. Venters, 123 F.3d at 973-74.
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right to First Amendment religious expression. 1 1 However, the court
held that the employer's religious remarks went beyond creating
"mere discomfort" for Venters; the remarks were used to "impose [the
employer's] religious views on Venters as his subordinate."l5 2
The Ninth Circuit has taken an even more permissive approach
to prima facie standards for reverse religious discrimination claims. In
Noyes v. Kelly Services, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Shapolia's
reasoning that a reverse religious discrimination claim does not
require the plaintiff to demonstrate membership in a protected class
because it is the "religious beliefs of the employer, and the fact that
[the employee] does not share them, that constitute the basis of the
[religious discrimination] claim."153 However, unlike the Tenth Circuit
in Shapolia, the Ninth Circuit did not replace the protected-class
requirement with a background-circumstances requirement.154 In
other words, reverse religious discrimination plaintiffs in the Ninth
Circuit establish their prima facie case simply by alleging that they
were subject to adverse employment action at a time when their
performance was satisfactory.15 5
The Ninth Circuit requires no formal showing of religious
differences between the employer and employee. In Noyes, the plaintiff
was not a member of the Fellowship, her supervisor's chosen religious
group.156 Noyes applied for a promotion and was competing against
another candidate who was a member of the Fellowship.157 The Court
of Appeals did not require Noyes to demonstrate her own religious
beliefs (or lack thereof).15 8 Even without a formal pleading of the
differences between the employer's and employee's religious beliefs,
the Ninth Circuit found that Noyes had established a prima facie
case.159
B. Comparingthe Minority and Majority Approaches
While the Sixth Circuit declined to definitively rule on whether
the protected-class element was required to establish a prima facie
151. See id. at 977 (discussing the supervisor's own First Amendment rights to free
expression in the workplace, even as a public employee).
152. Id.
153. Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2007).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1166.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1168-69 (discussing briefly Noyes's prima facie case, and noting only that "Noyes
does not claim she was part of a protected class, i.e., that she adheres to a particular religion").
159. Id. at 1169.
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case of discrimination, the court's analysis implied that it was.160 The
court required the employee in Pedreira to demonstrate that her
sexuality was linked to her religiousbeliefs (which may include a lack
of religious faith). The court's insistence on this requirement likely
stems from its overarching concern about the potential use of reverse
religious discrimination claims as proxy claims. 161 Since Pedreira
could not connect her homosexuality to her religious beliefs, the court
dismissed the claim because it really sought redress for sexual
orientation discrimination.16 2 This minority approach makes it
unlikely that any LGBT plaintiff could succeed on a reverse religious
discrimination claim because few individuals derive their sexual
orientation from their religious beliefs. While this result respects local
legislative judgments, it also imposes a burden on plaintiffs seeking
compensation for discrimination based on their nonassociation with
their supervisor's religious group.
Although demonstrating membership in a protected class is
difficult for traditional reverse discrimination plaintiffs, the hurdle is
not nearly as burdensome for plaintiffs alleging reverse religious
discrimination. For example, it is difficult for a white male to
demonstrate that he is a member of a protected class (i.e., a racial
minority group) when he brings a reverse racial discrimination suit.
However, religious discrimination does not hinge on the same
majority/minority classifications as racial discrimination. Plaintiffs in
reverse religious discrimination cases can easily demonstrate
membership in a protected class by showing that they hold some
beliefs about religion (e.g., "I am a member of the Mormon/Catholic/
Hindu faith," "I am agnostic," "I am atheist").
However, the Ninth Circuit's failure to require any showing of
differences between the religious beliefs of the employer and employee
defeats the purpose of a prima facie analysis. Without formally
demonstrating that the employer and employee have religious
differences, the prima facie test does not eliminate nondiscriminatory
reasons for the adverse action. Similarly, Shapolia's broad
background-circumstances
requirement opens
the
door to
impingement on employers' First Amendment right to religious
expression. By allowing an employer's unexpressed private beliefs and
non-work related statements and activities to serve as background
circumstances, an employer's personal religious associations may be
160. See supra Part III.A.
161. Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 579 F.3d 722, 727-28 (6th Cir. 2009).
162. See id. at 728 (discussing the status of sexual orientation discrimination in Kentucky

and the Sixth Circuit).
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unfairly used to find the employer liable for employment
discrimination.
As originally conceived, Title VII was meant to provide
protection only for members of a protected class that has traditionally
been subject to discrimination. 16 3 Under the majority approach,
however, reverse religious discrimination moves from discrimination
against a "majority" to discrimination against all "non-members,"
which significantly expands the scope of liability for employers. 164
The prima facie standard is particularly important for
determining the viability of using reverse religious discrimination as a
proxy claim for sexual orientation discrimination. If a court follows the
majority approach and adopts a more lenient standard for prima facie
cases, then it would likely accept reverse religious discrimination
claims as proxy claims. 65
C. ConsideringProxy Claims
Proxy claims allow plaintiffs to seek protection for
discrimination that the local or national legislature has not addressed.
Courts typically avoid making such difficult policy decisions, since the
politically accountable branches of government seem to be a more
legitimate source of new law in the United States. 166 However,
particularly with civil rights, courts have been important forerunners
in extending protection for minority groups. 167 A modern society may
value the courts' activism in protecting the rights of minorities and
ensuring public equality. Conversely, society may also value judicial
restraint. Will courts again be the forum that advocates for expanded
minority rights-this time by allowing proxy claims for sexual
orientation to proceed?
The United States Supreme Court's recent precedent suggests
that the answer is no. The Roberts Court has been particularly
focused on ensuring that it has jurisdiction to hear the cases before
it.168 The requirement that a plaintiff bring a legally cognizable claim
163. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing a prima
facie framework for Title VII discrimination claims).
164. For an analysis of the majority approach, see infra Part III. B.
165. See Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2007) and the Ninth
Circuit's jurisprudence on reverse religious discrimination claims.
166. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013).
167. See supra note 25.
168. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685-86 (2013) (considering the Article
III standing requirements to determine whether judicial consideration is appropriate);
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 (analyzing the Article III "case or controversy" requirement to
decide the appropriate degree of judicial restraint).
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(as opposed to a proxy claim) serves a similar limiting function. These
procedural limits ensure that courts "act as judges, and do not engage
in policymaking properly left to elected representatives."1 69 Lower
courts have also formally adopted this attitude in determining the
scope of Title VII.170 Even when discrimination based on sexual
orientation may offend values of equality and justice, some courts
have "decline[d] to adopt a reading of Title VII that would. . . 'achieve

by judicial construction what Congress did not do and has consistently
refused to do on many occasions.' "171 In other words, lower courts are
understandably refusing to accept proxy claims because doing so is
consistent with recent Supreme Court precedents in this area. Thus, a
careful approach to Title VII proxy claims is needed to respect
Supreme Court precedent, individual liberty, and religious expression.
IV. ALIGNING LAW AND VALUES: PROPOSED TREATMENT OF REVERSE
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER A MODIFIED
McDONNELL DOUGLAS PRIMA FACIE TEST

This Note proposes a modified five-part McDonnell Douglas
prima facie test. The Supreme Court acknowledged that modifications
to the original McDonnell Douglas standard would be required to
adapt it from traditional Title VII claims to other employment
contexts. 172 The standard proposed here makes several substantive
changes to the traditional prima facie test outlined in McDonnell
Douglas but accommodates both the existing majority and minority
approaches. This modified standard accounts for the important role of
prima facie cases in employment discrimination litigation and
attempts to balance the sometimes-conflicting values of religious
expression and nondiscrimination. Significantly, this standard also
respects legislative judgments on sexual orientation discrimination
and limits the use of reverse religious discrimination claims as proxy
claims. Of course, plaintiffs are always able to make a prima facie case
for reverse religious discrimination by providing direct proof of
religious discrimination. The plaintiff in Venters provided this sort of
proof by demonstrating that the employer considered religious criteria
169. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
170. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining to provide
protection against sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979) (dismissing a discrimination claim reasoning that
sexual orientation did not fall within Title VII's protected classes).
171. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 37 (quoting DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 330).
172. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d
1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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when making employment decisions. 73 This Note proposes a standard
for prima facie cases made through indirect proof of reverse religious
discrimination.
Specifically, the proposed five-part modified McDonnell
Douglas prima facie analysis for reverse religious discrimination
claims consists of the following parts:
1. Is the employer a religious organization under Title VII?
2. Was the employee subjected to an adverse employment
action 174?
3. At the time the adverse employment action was taken, was
the employee's job performance satisfactory?
4. Has the employee alleged that his or her religious beliefs
differ from his or her employer's religious beliefs?
5. Has the employee provided evidence that the employment
action was motivated by the employee's failure to conform
to the employer's religious views?
To explicitly acknowledge the protected status of religious
organizations and their internal decisions, the court should first
engage in a threshold inquiry as to whether the defendant qualifies as
a religious organization under Title VII.75 Religious organizations are
defined as institutions whose "purpose and character are primarily
religious." 76 Title VII provides an explicit and complete exception
"with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion
or to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation."'7 7
The second and third prongs of the modified McDonnell
Douglas standard reflect the basic evidentiary requirements of the
second and third prongs of the original McDonnell Douglas standard,
and the first and second prongs of the Shapolia prima facie
173. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 39.
175. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 698
(2012) (holding that employment discrimination laws, like Title VII, do not apply to religious
organizations' decisions on leaders under the First Amendment Religion Clauses).
176. See, e.g., Hall v. Baptist Mem. Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624-25 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a college of health sciences qualified as a religious institution under Title VII
because it was affiliated with a church hospital, had a direct relationship with the Baptist
church, and was "permeated with religious overtones"); EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859
F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the purpose and character of a for-profit
manufacturing company were not primarily religious despite the Christian beliefs espoused by
the owners of the corporation).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012).
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standard. 78 Prongs two and three of the modified standard proposed
here are not substantive changes to the original McDonnell Douglas
prima facie standard.
The fourth prong of the modified test addresses the protectedclass requirement of the first prong in the original McDonnell Douglas
prima facie standard. To balance the constitutional values of religious
expression and equality, the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie should be modified for reverse religious discrimination
claims. In these cases, plaintiffs should provide specific evidence as to
the difference between their own religious beliefs (or lack thereof) and
their employer's religious beliefs. This approach removes the difficulty
of classifying certain religious beliefs as majority or minority views,
while still addressing the possibility that an employee is being
discriminated against because he does not share his employer's
religious beliefs. Given some courts' doubt about the separateness of
reverse discrimination, and Title VII's limited scope, a more
traditional prima facie standard is particularly appropriate for reverse
religious discrimination claims.179
Contrary to the Third Circuit's criticism of the backgroundcircumstances requirement, this modified prong does not place a
higher burden on reverse religious discrimination plaintiffs than
traditional Title VII plaintiffs. A traditional Title VII plaintiff must
demonstrate his membership in a protected class. Similarly, under the
modified fourth prong, a reverse religious discrimination plaintiff
must demonstrate that he has specific religious beliefs and that those
beliefs differ from his employer's beliefs. 80 As applied to reverse
religious discrimination claims, the modified fourth prong prevents
plaintiffs from receiving protection from sexual orientation
discrimination in jurisdictions where legislatures have chosen not to
prohibit it. In other words, plaintiffs must show that the alleged
discrimination was motivated by the employee's religious beliefs on
homosexuality, not merely their homosexual conduct or lifestyle.
Finally, the fifth prong embraces the commonsense notion of
the prima facie standard and incorporates a version of Shapolia's
background-circumstances requirement and ladiamarco's totality-of-

178. See supra Part IIA.
179. See supra note 54-55 and accompanying text.
180. This approach draws on the Northern District of Indiana's interpretation of the
Shapoliastandard in McIntire v. Keystone RVCo., No. 3:10-CV-508, 2011 WL 5434242 (N.D. Ind.
2011), but does require a specification of the plaintiffs religious beliefs (or lack thereof).
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the-circumstances approach.18 In reverse religious discrimination
cases alleging disparate treatment, the fifth prong should be
interpreted in light of the high evidentiary requirement articulated in
Venters, Prowel, and Erdmann.182 To succeed on this prong, plaintiffs
should present evidence of the employer's behavior indicating that he
sought to impose his religious views on his subordinate. 8 3 Venters,
Prowel, and Erdmann demonstrate that true reverse religious
discrimination usually occurs when there is repeated proselytization,
rather than an implicit accusation of noncompliance with a single
religious belief of the employer.184 By requiring evidence that the
employer engaged in attempted conversion, religious coercion, or other
similar behavior, courts can simultaneously remedy reverse religious
discrimination and protect employers' First Amendment rights to selfexpression. This prong makes the most significant change to the
original McDonnell Douglas framework, but it is most important in
addressing the conflicting values inherent in a reverse religious
discrimination claim.
If courts adopt the majority approach to the backgroundcircumstances requirement as articulated in Shapolia, it is unclear
what kind of facts will suffice to "support the inference that the
employment actions were taken because of a discriminatory
motive."185 Is it enough that the employee has knowledge of the
employer's private religious beliefs, even though the employer never
expressed them in the workplace? It will be difficult for lower courts to
administer this element without encroaching on employers'
constitutional rights to religious association and expression. The
revised evidentiary requirement in prong five of the modified standard
provides a more workable threshold that requires evidence of the
employer's coercive behavior or discriminatory animus.
A modified McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard for
reverse religious discrimination claims protects constitutional
freedoms and preserves the original scope of Title VII. By requiring
181. See ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999):
[A]l1 that should be required to establish a prima facie case in the context of
"reverse discrimination" is for the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to
allow a fact finder to conclude that the employer is treating some people less
favorably than others based upon a trait that is protected under Title VII.
(emphasis added).
182. See supranotes 127-35, 145-52, and accompanying text.
183. See Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 977 (7th Cir. 1997) (reviewing the line
between an employer's First Amendment rights to religious expression in the workplace and the
employee's right to be free from the imposition of religious beliefs).
184. See supranote 182.
185. Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1993).
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plaintiffs to demonstrate the link between their sexuality and
religious beliefs, courts avoid undemocratically extending protection
for sexual orientation discrimination in jurisdictions where it is not
prohibited. This result encourages democratic accountability by
requiring legislatures, rather than courts, to prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination if the electorate demands it. Most
importantly, reducing the use of reverse religious discrimination
claims as proxy claims for sexual orientation discrimination preserves
the integrity of federal common law and the scope of First Amendment
religious expression rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Reverse religious discrimination claims are an increasingly
popular method for redressing sexual orientation discrimination in
jurisdictions where such discrimination is not prohibited. The history
of sexual orientation discrimination law and the failure of various
proxy claims demonstrate the need for litigants to seek alternative
methods for redressing sexual orientation discrimination. In response
to the newest proxy claim-reverse religious discrimination-circuit
courts have adopted two contrasting standards for what constitutes a
prima facie case.
The minority approach, adopted by the Sixth and Third
Circuits, utilizes a traditional McDonnell Douglas prima facie
standard. This standard requires reverse religious discrimination
plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are part of a protected Title VII
class. More specifically, plaintiffs must show that their homosexual
conduct is derived from their own specific religious beliefs. In contrast,
the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted a lower
evidentiary burden that replaces the protected-class requirement with
a background-circumstances prong to support an inference of
discrimination.
In response, this Note proposes the application of a modified,
five-part McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard to reverse religious
discrimination claims. This proposed modification requires plaintiffs
to demonstrate the link between their sexual orientation and religious
beliefs and to provide evidence of religious coercion by their employer,
which strikes the appropriate balance between religious expression
and nondiscrimination. This test also reduces the availability of
reverse religious discrimination claims as proxy claims for sexual
orientation discrimination. Adopting a uniform standard for reverse
religious discrimination claims avoids manipulation of courts through
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proxy claims, encourages legislatures to act in response to societal
demands, and protects citizens' constitutional right to religious
expression.
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